consider is whether existing international and domestic law on genocide can be applied to the crimes committed at the residential schools. We begin our article with a short history of the schools. After this background, we proceed to a larger theoretical discussion concerning the difficulty of defining genocide and applying that definition in a meaningful legal way in Canada. Our position might be described as "fence sitting". We argue that the question of whether "genocide" was committed cannot be definitively settled at this time. In part this has to do with polyvalent interpretations of the term and the increasing pool of evidence from survivors and documents. We make the following observation and arguments:
First, Raphael Lemkin's original broad definition (1944) has been used by some indigenous scholars to interpret cultural, religious, linguistic, and other forms of collective suffering. The case may be made that a "Lemkinian" form of genocide did take place in Canada, due to demonstrable attempts to often violently assimilate indigenous people, exemplified by the many atrocities which took place in the schools. A Lemkinian definition includes cultural genocide as a form of genocide, which was later excluded from the final version of the UNGC.
Second, genocide is defined in international law through the UNGC and later interpretations at the ICTY and ICTR. The UNGC requires that prosecutors prove perpetrators had a specific intent to commit genocide (dolens specialis). This provision makes it difficult to argue that genocide occurred over the long history of the IRS system in Canada. Case law has helped redefine the UNGC and has created expanded definitions and legal precedents which are influential in setting international and domestic norms.
Third, genocide is more narrowly defined in Canadian domestic law, and in domestic legal proceedings. In a Canadian legal context, a finding of genocide is even more unlikely. Graham demonstrates this clearly in his later discussion of domestic case law and the domestic incorporation of international covenants and statutes. There were and are political and well as judicial implications here.
Fourth, our knowledge about the IRS system is evolving. Any claims about genocide based on "facts" take place on shifting sands. Schedule N of the "Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement" has tasked the TRC with documenting what occurred in the schools through oral and written statements by survivors and others. The TRC has also planned public events designed to stimulate discussion between Aboriginal peoples and other Canadians about the ongoing legacies of this history and how forms of justice and reconciliation might be achieved. In addition to collecting and interpreting statements from survivors, and writing a final report, the TRC will also be investigating the issue of intent behind the IRS system. The "Missing Children Research Project", created in 2007 as part of the TRC's mandate, aims to find and name as many missing children as possible and to document how they died. Historian John Milloy is currently directing the investigation, which will continue until 2014. When the Project issues it report, academics and other interested parties will be in a more solid position to consider whether genocide applies, based on a larger body of evidence (Working Group on Missing Children / TRC). 2 Since David is helping to contribute to the work of the TRC, it is hoped that our future work may draw conclusions from the TRC's findings.
Fifth, we conclude that terms like "cultural genocide" and "ethnocide" convey the essence of what the IRS system was about: the attempted destruction of Aboriginal languages, religions, and cultures in Canada. Cultural genocide was excluded as a category of genocide in the UNGC, largely due to concerns by ratifying states that they might actually be committing breaches of the convention they were about to sign. 3 The ratification process created a series of loopholes through which settler governments such as Canada, the USA, and Australia, have jumped. Cultural genocide is more accurate than "forcible assimilation", we argue, because groups with clearly defined identities were targeted as groups, rather than as individuals. Forced assimilation does not convey the full extent of the loss of languages, traditions, and skills as a result of the IRS system.
The term is a moral descriptor anchored in a legal historical process which did recognize the crimes to which Aboriginal peoples were being subjected. We also consider whether the UNGC should include cultural genocide and relax its strict emphasis on the dolens specialis.
A Brief Background to the Residential Schools.
The IRS system was created within the broader context of the colonization of Canada.
The history of Aboriginal-European relations can be broken down into several periods, beginning with the era of initial contact and the fur trade. From 1867 to 1945, Confederation resulted in a two-tiered system with federal and provincial governments, a system which largely ignored the treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples and froze out any attempts at self-government as a third branch. 4 Aboriginal peoples lost their status and were often treated as "wards, or guardians, of federal authority", and consequently denied the ability to represent themselves in provincial or federal legislatures, law courts, or land markets. 5 A series of thirteen numbered treaties between 1871 and 1929 laid the basis for further European colonization. Aboriginal peoples surrendered land in return for concessions such as reserve land allotted on a per capita basis, and a variety of privileges, tax exemptions and government services. However in many cases, the treaty process "was riddled with deceit" as Fleras and Elliot put it, being seen as vehicle to separate
Aboriginal peoples from their land and bring them further under government control. 6 Certainly there were periods of cooperation, even métissage, as Saul has discussed In 1879, a residential school was established in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, which served as a model for the further 500 schools established in the United States, through which 100,000
Native Americans passed (Milloy, 1996: 13; Smith, 2006; Wallace, 1995 Milloy, 1996) . 7 Until the 1950s, attendance at these schools for children aged five to sixteen was compulsory.
At least 150,000 children passed through a network of some 125 schools. 8 and cultural destruction). 15 The report clearly stated problems of neglect, underfunding, and widespread abuse, not to mention the "very high death rate" from tuberculosis, as involved with the decimation of group identity -that something unique and precious was lost from the world. Lemkin outlined two ways that genocide occurs. The most obvious is the mass killing of a large proportion of the members of a group. The second method is the intentional destruction of the foundation or underlying structure that supports the group and distinguishes it from other groups. 19 Either way, genocide would be the result of intentional, sustained, and purposeful action.
Lemkin provided a range of examples to illustrate his arguments: the persecution of Polish Catholic clergy by Nazi Germany (religious genocide); the promotion of alcohol and pornography during the same period (moral genocide), using an appeal to "cheap individual pleasure" to weaken national consciousness and resistance. In all cases, the issue of intent is crucial, because the destruction of the group has to be sought out in order for genocide to take place. This intentionality found its way into the UNGC in 1948, but many of the other aspects of Lemkin's definition were substantially narrowed.
The UNGC's Article 2 defines genocide as follows:
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: Yet, the UNGC was the product of a political process and subject to a certain degree of horse-trading. Cultural genocide and Lemkin's other categories were rejected, although the forced transfer of children and the prevention of births were retained. Political, linguistic, and cultural groups were removed during bargaining sessions between the Soviet Union and various settler societies, including the US, Canada and Australia, leaving behind religious, national, and racial groups. 21 However, we must also be careful not to see the UNGC as a static document. Samantha
Power (2002) we have judicial interpretations of how large a "part" of the target group must be killed for an act to be considered genocide. In most cases the "part" should be significant, although the Srebrenica ruling is problematic on that count (since the "in part" were the Bosnian Moslems of Srebrenica not BiH as a whole). 22 Other issues concern how clearly "intent" to commit genocide must be proven, and whether or not rape can be considered an act of genocide. It now can be. 23 Case law also firmed up the definitions of victims, perpetrators and a host of other aspects of the UNGC. Victim groups were quite narrowly demarcated under the 1955
Nottebohm Case, where nationality was defined as "the political and legal bond that links a person to a given state and binds him to it with ties of loyalty and fidelity, entitling him to diplomatic protection from that state". 24 Case law from the ICTR and ICTY has broadened the definition to include "a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties". 25 Here references to the state have been dropped, allowing for stateless persons or indigenous peoples without state-based claims to be considered victims of genocide. A racial group has also been defined in the course of the ICTR as a group "based on the hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors", while an ethnic group is defined as one "whose members share a common language or culture". 26 It has been more precisely defined as a group whose members share a common language and culture or, "a group which distinguishes itself, as such (self identification); or, a group identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others)". 27 One of the distinguishing features of genocide which case law continually reaffirms is the crucial importance of a specific intent or dolens specialis to "destroy, in whole or in part, an identifiable group of persons". Although not identical, all of the acts prohibited by the UNGC, such as murder, assault, conspiracy, attempts, aiding and abetting, and forcible transfers, are already crimes under Canadian law. It is the added dimension of genocidal intent as towards a protected group that warrants the unparalleled stigma and punishment associated with the crime of genocide. With the slight exception of complicity, this requires prosecutors to prove, both, that the accused committed the underlying offence, and, that they did so with the specific intent to destroy a protected group. It should be recalled that, although a few courts have cautiously recognized the intent to destroy a group "as a social unit" to be culpable, 28 the preponderance of jurisprudence is that the accused must have intended the physical and biological destruction of a group.
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Genocide in Canadian Law
Lacking centralized institutions of enforcement, the effectiveness of international law is highly dependent on the cooperation of domestic legal, political, and social institutions.
Unfortunately, nowhere in Canadian constitutional or statutory law are there clear rules governing the domestic legal status of international law. The judiciary has filled in this space by fashioning a hodge-podge of common law doctrines. 30 How one approaches the UNGC and its role in Canada can be tempered through the lenses of monism, dualism, and a "persuasive authority" approach. In the pre-Charter era, the reception of international law was governed by the "presumption of conformity" doctrine. 32 When so inclined, judges would interpret statutes so as to give effect to the binding international treaties these statutes implemented. They also interpreted ordinary law and policy so as to consist with binding, other things, a declaration that the residential school system and the conduct of the defendants in respect thereof contravened the UNGC. Importantly, the plaintiffs were not seeking damages or monetary awards, but simply a declaration that conduct carried out with respect to residential schools was inconsistent with the UNGC. The defendants countered by arguing that:
[T]here is no independent cause of 'genocide'. The only statutory reference to genocide, they submit, is at section 318 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits the promotion of genocide. However, they point out that that section was not in force at the time that the alleged events occurred and that 'genocide', as it appears in the Criminal Code refers only to the physical destruction of peoples and not "cultural genocide" which appears to be the subject of the United Nations Convention. 44 They then described arguments supported by reference to the UNGC as "political" and not justiciable, presumably because the convention had not been legislatively implemented. 45 Unfortunately, the court ruled that it lacked "the jurisdiction to award a declaratory order on the basis of a non-legal or political code of conduct". 46 This judgment highlights a fairly common and highly contestable judicial attitude towards the UNGC as a "political" or moral standard and not, absent legislation to the contrary, a legally binding document. It also ignores relevant and binding international customary law norms.
The UNGC has been invoked in a handful of other cases with colonial dimensions. In
Raubach et al. v. The Attorney General of Canada et al.,
47 the court ruled against a claim that the government was liable for breach of contract for instituting and operating residential school systems in contravention of the UNGC. It held that it is "doubtful that even if proven such an allegation could sustain a cause of action". 48 It did go on to rule, though, that the place of alleged assaults in "a program of cultural genocide" might be relevant to the assessment of punitive or aggravated damages for assaults perpetrated in residential schools. 49 The UNGC has on occasion been cited in support of arguments that
Canadian law is not applicable to members of First Nations, 50 but in no case have these arguments been recognized as legally valid, much less compelling.
In sum, courts have found the UNGC to be inapplicable owing to the principle of nonretroactivity and to its "political" nature. Because the UNGC became treaty law only in 1948, and the alleged abuses occurred prior to this point, the UNGC has been held to be inapplicable. Missing from judges' reasoning, and claimants' arguments, is the fact that the UNGC codifies customary law and, as such, residential abuses could have been 55 It then outlined a non-exhaustive list of acts that constitute serious bodily and mental harm, which include "acts of torture, be they bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution", 56 as well as acts of sexual violence, rape, mutilations and interrogations combined with beatings, and/or threats of death as acts that amount to serious bodily harm. 57 This was the first time rape was regarded as a potentially genocidal act. One year later, the Trial Chamber in Kayishema held that the phrases "serious bodily harm" and "serious mental harm" should both be defined contextually and on a case-by-case-basis. 58 A Tribunal for the ICTY further specified that the harm must be such as "to contribute, or tend to contribute, to the destruction of the group or part thereof". 59 Given that intent to destroy a protected group, in whole or in part, is a prerequisite of all acts of genocide, it can be inferred that Trial Chambers for the ICTR did not feel the need to specify this element in their judgments. Alternatively, this qualification may represent an attempt to impose an added, material element to the offence, requiring that harms that meet the above-stated definitions also tend towards the physical and biological destruction of the group. It is not, however, a qualification endorsed by many tribunals, suggesting that intent to destroy a group, when combined with acts that cause serious bodily and mental harm, constitutes a genocidal act regardless of how effective the act is at actually destroying a group.
Chambers have distinguished between bodily harm and mental harm. As a general indicator, the Trial Chamber in Kayishema held that serious bodily harm includes "harm that seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any serious injury to the external, internal organs or senses". 60 It defined mental harm as that which is more than a minor or temporary impairment of mental faculties. 61 Chambers have consistently ruled that there need not be any correlation between bodily harm and mental harm. In
Rutaganda, for instance, a Trial Chamber held that serious mental harm includes mental torture and inhumane or degrading treatment that may be inflicted independently of physical abuse or harm. 62 This approach has been endorsed in a number of subsequent cases handled by the ICTR. 63 Trial Chambers for the ICTY similarly held that, while serious harm "must involve harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation", it includes "harm that results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person's ability to lead a normal and constructive life". 64 Canadian courts have adopted these approaches to serious bodily and mental harm, agreeing that the determination of this offence should be made on a case-by-case basis. 65 Citing Kajelijeli, the Quebec Superior Court held that "the following principles emerge from the (international) jurisprudence: "(a) the harm may be physical or mental; (b) the physical harm need not be permanent or irreversible, but must be likely to prevent the victim from living a normal life over a relatively long period; (c) the mental harm must go beyond slight or temporary deterioration of mental faculties; (d) the harm must be so serious that it threatens to destroy the targeted group in whole or in part." 66 It would be reasonable to hold that this genocidal act is directly applicable to the case of Aboriginal residential schools. Many of the acts that constitute serious bodily and mental harm are known to have been performed by governmental officials and private parties during the operation of these schools. These acts include: sexual assault, threats of death, severe beatings and assault, resultant disfigurements, inhuman and degrading treatment (including systematic assaults on Aboriginal self-identity), disfigurement, and serious injuries to health as a result of the forced cohabitation of healthy children with children infected with communicable diseases.
When dealing with the UNGC, namely "deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy the group" we also need to consider how jurisprudence might apply in Canada. The Trial Chamber in Akayesu construed this term as the "methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction". 67 It then provided a nonexhaustive list of acts which meet this definition, including: subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes, and the reduction of essential medical services below minimum requirements. 68 A year later, another Trial Chamber provided more detail, holding that the term "includes circumstances which will lead to a slow death, for example, lack of proper housing, clothing, hygiene and medical care or excessive work or physical exertion". 69 Lack of proper housing, coupled with reduction of medical services below minimum requirements as well as lack of clothing and hygiene, seem to allow for negligence or acts of omission to qualify as genocidal. These two sets of lists are non-exhaustive and not mutually exclusive, evidenced by subsequent Trial Chambers' regular use of both. 70 As regards mens rea, Trial Chambers have required proof that an accused have, both, intended to inflict through acts of commission or omission proscribed conditions of life, and, that these conditions be among the primary mechanisms used to physically and biologically destroy a group. The conditions, in other words, cannot be incidental to other possibly genocidal acts; they must be one of the principal measures through which an alleged perpetrator carries out a plan to physically and biologically destroy a protected group. 71 As a result of this weighty requirement, there have been no convictions regarding the horrific living conditions in Bosnian detention camps.
There is, though, evidence to suggest that some of the actions of those who participated in the administration of Aboriginal residential schools fall under the concept of "deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy the group". But, looming again is special intention and distinctions among physical, biological, and cultural genocide. All acts must have been "calculated" to destroy a group and this has been uniformly interpreted to mean that the conditions must be one of the primary means of physically and biologically destroying a group; the case law is clear on this corporal component. Now, such acts as placing healthy children within close proximity to those with infectious diseases, and in these and other circumstances refusing to provide basic medical services to those in need, would perhaps be the best candidates. Provided genocidal intent is proven, such acts could reasonably be interpreted as calculated to cause physical and biological destruction.
What of forcible transfer of children, the category of the UNGC on which the Australian stolen generations was found to be victims of genocide? In some ways, the elements of this category of genocidal acts are clear. The actus reus consists in the physical, forcible transfer of children from a protected group to another group. The mens rea consists in the specific intent to forcibly remove children from one group to another group. However, the real problem is genocidal intent. All of the other categories of genocidal acts relate to physical and biological destruction of the group, and so the attribution of intent is directed to material destruction. In the case of forcible transfers of children, the result would be, on its own, long-term, cultural destruction of the group. Physical and biological destruction would only occur simultaneously if acts falling under any of the other categories of genocidal acts were also performed. But in this case, culpability would arise from those acts alone. At root, culpability for the forcible transfer of children on its own would seem to require that alleged perpetrators have intended the cultural extinguishment of a protected group. It is for this reason, more than any other, that there is so little international jurisprudence concerning this genocidal act. It has been left to national courts to progressively expand the scope of genocide to include cultural acts, using in many instances this very category as justification.
Reworking Dolens Specialis?
Overall, as we have shown, the corpus of international and domestic law built up around the UNGC is unlikely to support a judicial finding of genocide in Canada. This does not mean that acts we might consider genocidal will not be recognized as such in the future.
In the present political environment, and within the criminal law context, courts lack the discretion and, apparently, the will to consider such claims. Criminal prosecutions require the Attorney General's written consent; an event that is unlikely to occur. More broadly, there exists a persistent judicial tendency to misrecognize the domestic legal status of relevant international law under cover of principles of non-retroactivity. This has impeded sustained engagement with relevant law in even private law settings, where the judiciary does posses the discretion to consider international and foreign law on genocide.
Clearly some activities committed during the residential school era may credibly be subsumed within underlying genocidal offences, and maybe even within progressive interpretations of special intent. But the slow trend towards relaxing the Dolens specialis requirement is nowhere near a tipping point. Strict readings have been upheld in international law, particularly by the ICTR and ICTY; the individual committing the act must clearly intend to physically and biologically destroy a group.
There is a strong dissonance between many genocide scholars and jurists over dolens specialis and how central a role it should play in the UNGC. 72 In the American context, Bischoping and Fingerhut focus on "relations of destruction" -the outcome on colonization for the victims rather than the ideology or the specific intent. 73 From
Australia, Tony Barta asserts that a lack of intent need not detract from the reality of genocide. He argues for "a conception of genocide which embraces relations of destruction and removes from the word the emphasis on policy and intention which brought it into being." 74 For Helen Fein, genocide can be the result of "sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly." 75 To this Roger Smith adds that even if there is no genocidal intent at the beginning, once a colonial government recognizes that its policies are genocidal, and does nothing, genocidal intent can be proven to exist. After all, "to persist is to intend the death of a people". 76 Here -it is the system, but not any specific policies or actors, which brings about genocide.
These scholars call for revisions to the definition of genocide under international law which would seek to overturn the emphasis on the dolens specialis and other restrictive elements. We recognize the merit and the persuasiveness of these arguments.
Unfortunately, the UNGC and associated jurisprudence is clear that intent to commit genocide must be proven and that intention must relate to physical and biological destruction. This maintains the dominant view that relaxations in weighty fault elements would debase genocide, collapsing its distinguishing feature into the underlying offences which are by and large already ordinary crimes; genocide is, and should be maintained as, "the crime of crimes". 77 It seems unlikely international law will change to reflect these concerns, and equally unlikely that the more restrictive Canadian version of genocide will adopt an even more progressive stance.
Cultural Genocide
We have argued that "cultural genocide" or "ethnocide" may be appropriate to describe much of Canada's treatment of Aboriginal peoples, and is often used by genocide scholars. This is employed in cases where mass death did not accompany colonization, but active attempts to destroy culture, language, and religion, while stealing land and outlawing customs did occur. 78 As Israel Cherny has argued, ethnocide aims at the, Of these only (a) survived the vote of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.
Another aspect of genocide, forcing people to abandon their homes, was also voted down (see Schabas, 2008) . 82 Calls for a more inclusive definition of genocide are hardly new. Canada would be reinterpreted, both legally, and morally. These changes would provide wider legal scope for reassessing the IRS system in Canada.
Conclusion: Aboriginal Peoples, the Canadian Government, and International Law
Have Aboriginal groups attempted to take the Canadian government to court at A stronger footing may be found in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was reluctantly approved by Canada in November 2010. Article 7 does discuss genocide in Section 2, insofar as "Indigenous peoples … shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, including forcibly removing children of the group to another group." 83 This is an obvious reference to the UNGC and makes particular mention of this provision. The 1994 draft made reference to both "ethnocide and cultural genocide" but defined neither term. It also laid out in Article 7 that signatory states would be responsible for "prevention of and redress for" a series of acts as follows: consistently argued for. 85 We might also learn from the Australian example. In Australia, the forcible removal of international tribunals, and victimized people. Whether or not the IRS system will be proven to be genocidal, Canada still has a very long way to go before any form of reconciliation can be achieved.
